Did Deterrence Fail in 2010
[2011年07月20日(Wed)]
*Following is the essay posted to the Asia Foundation's News Letter (July 2011)
The sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 raised concerns for both the South Korean and U.S. governments that North Korea may no longer be conventionally deterred. The two governments have been reviewing how their basic and extended deterrence policies should be reorganized to adapt to this seemingly new dimension of North Korea’s behavior pattern. In reviewing deterrence, the following four considerations are particularly important:
Cost-Benefit Calculus
First, North Korea was certainly not deterred from launching limited strikes against the South not once but twice in 2010. The failure to prevent an adversary from engaging in repetitive acts of aggression derives from the adversary’s perceptions that the cost incurred for the previous attack did not exceed the benefit gained from it.
Looking back at the chronology of events from early summer to fall 2010, North Korea may have perceived that the ROK government’s response was weak especially in terms of mobilizing the international community to take collective actions against North Korea. The July 9 UN Security Council Statement on the Cheonan sinking failed to directly identify North Korea as responsible. International sanctions appeared further weakened as early as August when Hu Jintao met Kim Jong-il and pledged continued support for the North Korean economy. North Korea most likely learned that its attempt to escalate aggression against the South was successful and that there was still a margin for even further escalation.
Nuclear Deterrence
Second, due to progress in its nuclear weapons program, North Korea may have greater confidence in its capacity to control the level of escalation. Shortly before shelling Yeonpyeong Island, North Korea revealed its new uranium enrichment facility to visiting U.S. scientist Siegfried Hecker and reasserted its nuclear capabilities. These messages of nuclear weaponization were deliberately sent before the shelling of Yeongpyeong as signals to to deter large-scale U.S.-ROK retaliation. North Korea seemed to believe that such signals and its nuclear capacity enhanced the effectiveness of mutual deterrence vis-à-vis South Korea and the United States at the strategic level. As far as North Korean perceptions are concerned, the magnitude with which North Korea can conduct conventional armed attacks before inviting major military retaliation had significantly increased.
Stability-Instability Paradox
Third, there exists a certain logic of restraint and escalation control by both Koreas and the United States. South Korea retaliated in response to the Yeonpyeong shelling by firing about 80 shells at North Korean barracks, command structures and artillery near the border. There was no significant military escalation from North Korea despite its verbal attacks. South Korean F-16 and F-15 jets were also rushed to the area, but they did not provoke North Korean targets. More importantly, the United States did not take joint action directly on initial counter strikes. In terms of the range of escalation, the offensive exchanges in the Yeonpyeong case were relatively low in intensity.
We can reach a tentative assessment that deterrence failed in 2010 and is likely to fail again, but that escalation control succeeded. Along with the above two factors of North Korea’s cost-benefit analysis and mutual deterrence, escalation control indicates an “stability-instability paradox” on the Korean Peninsula. This paradox characterizes a decreasing probability of a major war but an increasing probability of low-level conflicts. North Korea assumed that South Korea and the United States did not want the minor conflicts to escalate into a major one, making it safe to engage in the former.
China's Role in Deterring North Korea
Fourth, the role of China in deterring North Korean aggression is increasingly important. As deterrence consists of sets of action to convince a party to refrain from initiating harmful action, it is not necessarily determined only by opponents but also by supporters. China has two options in regard to deterrence on the peninsula. China can weaken deterrence by exerting efforts to persuade South Korea and the United States to not pressure North Korea. China can also increase its anti-access and denial capability to encourage North Korean military operations. For example, Chinese objection to the U.S.-ROK Yellow Sea naval exercise in July 2010 can be interpreted as an attempt to deny U.S. engagement access in a Korean contingency.
China also has the capacity to augment deterrence. North Korean fear of abandonment from China continues to grow as indicated by the frequent visits by Kim Jong-il and other high-ranking officials to China. Given the stability-instability paradox, the role played by China in terms of deterring low-intensity aggression and supporting escalation control seems pivotal. China’s unusually active, intense and public degree of engagement after the Yeonpyeong incident showed how alarmed Beijing was by crisis escalation.
Japanese Perspective on Deterrence Failure
The apparent failure of deterrence on the Korean peninsula in 2010 has had a significant impact on Japanese perceptions of basic and extended deterrence and raises important questions regarding the role of U.S. security alliances in Northeast Asia. First, there is the question of whether North Korea believes that an increased level of aggression against Japan might also go without significant repercussions and costs. Although the thresholds are high for North Korea to conduct missile attacks or vigorous guerilla activities against Japan, the Japanese government should pay greater attention to provocative behavior such as low-level and asymmetrical maritime assaults. Second, U.S. extended deterrence to Japan and South Korea should be equally strengthened in order to increase the cost of North Korean aggression. Bilateral security cooperation between Japan and South Korea should be given more importance since both countries share mutual interests in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance activities. Third, U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation must be upgraded to enhance the impact and credibility of U.S. deterrence in the region. The three countries must take concrete actions in line with the joint plans outlined in the foreign ministers’ statement of December 2010 in order to build a renewed and sustainable foundation for trilateral cooperation on North Korea and other regional challenges. This effort must also include joint steps to strengthen coordination with China as a rising regional power based on the common goal of Northeast Asian peace and stability.
The sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 raised concerns for both the South Korean and U.S. governments that North Korea may no longer be conventionally deterred. The two governments have been reviewing how their basic and extended deterrence policies should be reorganized to adapt to this seemingly new dimension of North Korea’s behavior pattern. In reviewing deterrence, the following four considerations are particularly important:
Cost-Benefit Calculus
First, North Korea was certainly not deterred from launching limited strikes against the South not once but twice in 2010. The failure to prevent an adversary from engaging in repetitive acts of aggression derives from the adversary’s perceptions that the cost incurred for the previous attack did not exceed the benefit gained from it.
Looking back at the chronology of events from early summer to fall 2010, North Korea may have perceived that the ROK government’s response was weak especially in terms of mobilizing the international community to take collective actions against North Korea. The July 9 UN Security Council Statement on the Cheonan sinking failed to directly identify North Korea as responsible. International sanctions appeared further weakened as early as August when Hu Jintao met Kim Jong-il and pledged continued support for the North Korean economy. North Korea most likely learned that its attempt to escalate aggression against the South was successful and that there was still a margin for even further escalation.
Nuclear Deterrence
Second, due to progress in its nuclear weapons program, North Korea may have greater confidence in its capacity to control the level of escalation. Shortly before shelling Yeonpyeong Island, North Korea revealed its new uranium enrichment facility to visiting U.S. scientist Siegfried Hecker and reasserted its nuclear capabilities. These messages of nuclear weaponization were deliberately sent before the shelling of Yeongpyeong as signals to to deter large-scale U.S.-ROK retaliation. North Korea seemed to believe that such signals and its nuclear capacity enhanced the effectiveness of mutual deterrence vis-à-vis South Korea and the United States at the strategic level. As far as North Korean perceptions are concerned, the magnitude with which North Korea can conduct conventional armed attacks before inviting major military retaliation had significantly increased.
Stability-Instability Paradox
Third, there exists a certain logic of restraint and escalation control by both Koreas and the United States. South Korea retaliated in response to the Yeonpyeong shelling by firing about 80 shells at North Korean barracks, command structures and artillery near the border. There was no significant military escalation from North Korea despite its verbal attacks. South Korean F-16 and F-15 jets were also rushed to the area, but they did not provoke North Korean targets. More importantly, the United States did not take joint action directly on initial counter strikes. In terms of the range of escalation, the offensive exchanges in the Yeonpyeong case were relatively low in intensity.
We can reach a tentative assessment that deterrence failed in 2010 and is likely to fail again, but that escalation control succeeded. Along with the above two factors of North Korea’s cost-benefit analysis and mutual deterrence, escalation control indicates an “stability-instability paradox” on the Korean Peninsula. This paradox characterizes a decreasing probability of a major war but an increasing probability of low-level conflicts. North Korea assumed that South Korea and the United States did not want the minor conflicts to escalate into a major one, making it safe to engage in the former.
China's Role in Deterring North Korea
Fourth, the role of China in deterring North Korean aggression is increasingly important. As deterrence consists of sets of action to convince a party to refrain from initiating harmful action, it is not necessarily determined only by opponents but also by supporters. China has two options in regard to deterrence on the peninsula. China can weaken deterrence by exerting efforts to persuade South Korea and the United States to not pressure North Korea. China can also increase its anti-access and denial capability to encourage North Korean military operations. For example, Chinese objection to the U.S.-ROK Yellow Sea naval exercise in July 2010 can be interpreted as an attempt to deny U.S. engagement access in a Korean contingency.
China also has the capacity to augment deterrence. North Korean fear of abandonment from China continues to grow as indicated by the frequent visits by Kim Jong-il and other high-ranking officials to China. Given the stability-instability paradox, the role played by China in terms of deterring low-intensity aggression and supporting escalation control seems pivotal. China’s unusually active, intense and public degree of engagement after the Yeonpyeong incident showed how alarmed Beijing was by crisis escalation.
Japanese Perspective on Deterrence Failure
The apparent failure of deterrence on the Korean peninsula in 2010 has had a significant impact on Japanese perceptions of basic and extended deterrence and raises important questions regarding the role of U.S. security alliances in Northeast Asia. First, there is the question of whether North Korea believes that an increased level of aggression against Japan might also go without significant repercussions and costs. Although the thresholds are high for North Korea to conduct missile attacks or vigorous guerilla activities against Japan, the Japanese government should pay greater attention to provocative behavior such as low-level and asymmetrical maritime assaults. Second, U.S. extended deterrence to Japan and South Korea should be equally strengthened in order to increase the cost of North Korean aggression. Bilateral security cooperation between Japan and South Korea should be given more importance since both countries share mutual interests in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance activities. Third, U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation must be upgraded to enhance the impact and credibility of U.S. deterrence in the region. The three countries must take concrete actions in line with the joint plans outlined in the foreign ministers’ statement of December 2010 in order to build a renewed and sustainable foundation for trilateral cooperation on North Korea and other regional challenges. This effort must also include joint steps to strengthen coordination with China as a rising regional power based on the common goal of Northeast Asian peace and stability.