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Cooperation with North Korea Unattractive for Russia

A Russian-born expert on North Korea talks about the reality of Russia-North Korea relations

Keisuke Fukuda : Columnist, Commentary Department, Toyo Keizai

January 10, 2024

As we enter the New Year 2024, tensions remain high on the Korean Peninsula. On December 30, 2023, North Korea's supreme leader, Kim Jong-un, leader of the Workers' Party of Korea, referred to relations with South Korea as hostile bilateral relations and belligerent relations, rather than "homologous relations." Furthermore, on January 5, 2024, it repeatedly shelled the NLL (Northern Limit Line), the border over the Yellow Sea in western South Korea, calling it a "drill.

What is North Korea thinking? We asked Andrei Lankov, a Russian-born professor at Kookmin University in South Korea and a prominent North Korean researcher, about the current situation and future prospects on the Korean Peninsula.

--On December 30, 2023, at an expanded meeting of the General Assembly of the Workers' Party of Korea Central Committee, one of the most important national meetings, Kim Jong-un referred to South Korea as a "belligerent" rather than a "comradely" country.

 Referring to it as an adversary is an important move. But there is something more important. Kim Jong Il has effectively acknowledged as a failure the decades-long course of North Korea's peaceful reunification. He stated that "none of the ideas, lines, and policies for peaceful reunification of the country put forward by our party and the government of the Republic of Korea (North Korea) have borne any real fruit."

More radical stance than "Seoul on Fire"

 If I remember correctly, the North Koreans have never given such a forceful warning and threat, as well as the term "belligerents. Strictly speaking, it is much stronger than the "Seoul on fire" threats they have been repeating from time to time since the early 1990s.

 On the other hand, this could be said to be an admission of objective reality or truth by Kim Jong Il. In fact, this is because talk of peaceful reunification was from the outset nothing more than propaganda that was far removed from reality. Nevertheless, the sudden abandonment of such propaganda has many implications.

 The Yun Suk-yeol administration in South Korea, as a conservative government, has continued to take a hard-line stance toward North Korea. It could be said that he showed his issatisfaction with this administration. However, if we look at the statement issued by Kim Yo-jeong, Kim Jong-il's sister and deputy director of the Workers' Party of Korea, on January 2, 2024, he repeatedly emphasized that whether South Korea is under a conservative or an innovative regime, they are the same to him as the "Republic of Korea".

 This time, North Korea's statement that it regards South Korea as an adversary existing next to it rather than as an object of unification is the beginning of a long-term change. This change can also be said to be an admission of reality, as noted above.

 By portraying it as a "totally foreign country" rather than a country of its own people, there is also a glimpse of the idea of reducing the attractiveness of South Korea within North Korea. In other words, if the public is led to believe that the Republic of Korea is one among many foreign countries, like Japan or the U.S., it will to some extent reduce the North Korean public's interest in unification.

 Nevertheless, I am not sure if such a policy will be effective. This is because the German Socialist Unity Party in the former East Germany, which was the Communist Party of East Germany, claimed that the former West Germany was a completely foreign country and that the people of East Germany were a different people from those of West Germany. However, these claims did not destroy the East German people's fascination with West Germany.

--In 2024, North Korea conducted firing drills in the NLL area of the Yellow Sea. Is this a measure due to the "hostile nation" statement?

 I do not believe that the shooting incident has anything to do with Kim Jong-un's "hostile state declaration.

 Recently, the conservative government in South Korea has not only been enthusiastically conducting military drills, but also actively promoting these drills to the public through the media in an attempt to attract public attention. North Korea is currently irritated by this.

Strong Interest in North Korea's "Artillery Shells

 North Korea has also responded by launching missiles and conducting military exercises in response to South Korean and joint U.S.-South Korean military drills. This is North Korea's stance of countering strong actions with strong actions, a small-scale "strong-versus-strong" strategy, so to speak. This is what North Korea has been doing and will continue to do.

 Nevertheless, we do not see a high probability of an armed conflict between North and South Korea in the foreseeable future. Both sides believe in the "strong-versus-strong" line, but we do not intend to engage in a large-scale war under the current circumstances.

 However, inter-Korean relations are strained, and a small-scale armed provocation, such as North Korea's 2010 shelling of Yeonpyeong Island (an island on the South Korean side of the Yellow Sea near the NLL), may be possible.

--It has been pointed out that North Korea is deepening its ties with Russia in connection with the ongoing war in Ukraine. It is suspected that it is exporting arms and other items to Russia and may be complicit in the war.

 The war in Ukraine has depleted Russia of artillery shells. Therefore, interest in North Korea's inventory of artillery ammunition is high. In fact, Russia is hoping to receive hundreds of thousands of artillery shells from North Korea.

 Russia has also hinted that it can transfer to North Korea important military technology it possesses. But this attitude is not directed solely at North Korea.

 While Russia is interested in North Korean shells, it is also very concerned about South Korea's export of shells to Ukraine. South Korea is now the world's leading producer of artillery shells.

 This means that Russia is putting pressure on South Korea while hinting that it could transfer important military technology to North Korea. This is a threat, so to speak, that Russia will transfer military technology to North Korea if it exports artillery shells to Ukraine. This, of course, is also aimed at the United States and European countries.

 Nevertheless, objectively speaking, the possibility of Russia transferring large-scale military technology to North Korea is not remote, but it is not high. Technology transfers related to reconnaissance satellites and conventional weapons are possible. However, technologies related to ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons are virtually impossible.

--In November 2023, North Korea announced the successful launch of a military reconnaissance satellite, and some believe that Russian technology was used for this.

 The possibility of technology transfer or licensing to a reconnaissance satellite cannot be ruled out. Although North Korea's possession of a reconnaissance satellite is a source of concern to neighboring countries, it also has a positive aspect. This is because the North Korean side will be able to grasp a certain amount of correct information on neighboring countries through the reconnaissance satellite, thereby reducing the possibility of making incorrect judgments.

Nuclear Weapons Technology Transfer and Cooperation Unlikely

 With the ongoing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the elements that could lead to war are accidental collisions and excesses due to misjudgment. In this regard, having North Korea's own intelligence sources is not a bad thing. Russia, too, is thinking positively about this in some respects.

--Why is it that Russia is not likely to transfer nuclear weapons technology to North Korea?
 
The United States is nervous about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but Russia is also most afraid of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If Russia were to provide or transfer core nuclear technology to North Korea and North Korea were to perfect and eventually advance the manufacture of nuclear weapons, Russia would set a bad example by creating a nuclear-weapon state of its own.

 Russia is extremely concerned about the transfer of North Korean experience to Russia's neighbors and the deterioration of Russia's security environment. In Russia's case, there is no country other than Belarus that it can feel comfortable with. The same is probably true of China.

 China also has nuclear weapons, but if North Korea were to perfect them and if they were to proliferate, the possibility of neighboring countries having nuclear weapons would increase dramatically. This is a worst-case scenario for both Russia and China.

--There are indications that economic relations between Russia and North Korea are expanding.

 In fact, I think there is little chance of a general increase in trade between the two countries. First of all, looking back at past economic exchanges between North Korea and Russia (Soviet Union), there is a history of expanding the scale of trade between the two countries only when the Russian side uses its national budget to boost economic exchanges.

 There are also some basic reasons. Few of the items that North Korea can sell on the international market are of interest to Russia. North Korea has natural resources such as coal and iron ore, but these items are more abundant in Russia. The same is true for marine products.

 There is only one item in which Russia has a major interest. North Korean labor. There have been many North Korean laborers working on Russian territory. With the ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia needs more labor.

 Human resources are in demand for Russia. That is why North Korean labor is attractive. Wages can be cheaper than Russians, and they are not overly demanding. Since the North Korean state acts as an intermediary, there are no troublesome incidents such as strikes. I think there is a strong possibility that the dispatch of workers to Russia will become more active in the future.

 However, it is unknown whether the Russian government will support the expansion of exchanges with North Korea. At present, there does not appear to be any such intention on the part of the Russian government. This is because North Korea does not have much strategic value to Russia.

North Korea's strategic value benefits China.

 For China, North Korea is a country of far greater strategic value than Russia. There is also the geopolitical significance of North Korea as a buffer zone on the Korean Peninsula. Many of North Korea's export items, such as coal, are in demand and sell well in China. Given the strength of the Chinese economy, the burden of supporting North Korea would be very small and beneficial.

 For these three countries in East Asia, the nucleus is still China. The relationship between China and North Korea is of more interest now than the relationship between Russia and North Korea, but it will not be as important as the relationship between China and North Korea.

--The three countries share the common denominator of being "anti-American," but will the solidarity among them deepen in the future?

 Actually, the relationship between these three countries has very serious problems. For example, in terms of GDP, China, Russia, and North Korea are 600:50:1. Economically, the relationship is too unequal.

 Also, in terms of values such as "anti-Americanism," there is precisely nothing to share except anti-Americanism and rejection of liberal democracy. Indeed, they are strongly dissatisfied with the U.S.-centered world order and are opposed to what the U.S. calls the "rules of the game.

 Therefore, while these three countries certainly loudly oppose and attack the U.S., they also dream of being able to compromise with the U.S. The problem is that the U.S. does not want these three countries to compromise with the U.S. The problem is that the US has no intention of compromising on the terms the three countries want.